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Abstract: Critics of commodification often claim that the buying and selling of some 
good communicates disrespect or some other inappropriate attitude. Such semiotic 
critiques have been leveled against markets in sex, pornography, kidneys, surrogacy, 
blood, and many other things. Brennan and Jaworski (2015a) have recently argued that all 
such objections fail. They claim that the meaning of a market transaction is a highly 
contingent, socially constructed fact. If allowing a market for one of these goods can 
improve the supply, access or quality of the good, then instead of banning the market on 
semiotic grounds, they urge that we should revise our semiotics. In this reply, I isolate a 
part of the meaning of a market transaction that is not socially constructed: our market 
exchanges always express preferences. I then show how cogent semiotic critiques of 
some markets can be constructed on the basis of this fact.  
I. SEMIOTIC CRITIQUES AND HOW TO REJECT THEM 
 During the congressional debate leading up to the National Organ Transplant Act of 1984, 
the legislation that banned the sale of human organs in the U.S., Dr. Bernard Towers, the co-
director of UCLA’s Program in Medicine, Law, and Human Values, made the following remark: 
There is something inherently offensive to the human conscience, I think, about treating a 
fellow human being as a thing. We must treat fellow human beings as persons and not as 
things, and the buying and selling of parts of human beings makes them into things, and I 
think that is morally repulsive. (National Organ Transplant Act 1983: 299) 
 Dr. Towers assumes that when we buy or sell some good, we treat that good as a mere 
thing. Since we don’t want to treat human beings (or parts of human beings) as mere things, we 
should not allow the sale of human organs. 
 The idea that the buying and selling of certain goods necessarily expresses attitudes 
which might be incompatible with the inherent dignity of the thing bought and sold, if true, has 
wide-ranging consequences. Arguments similar to the one made by Dr. Towers could be leveled 
against markets in sex, praise, votes, animals, religious artifacts, or great works of art. In buying 
and selling such things, we may be expressing attitudes incompatible with the dignity or 
significance of these things. 
 Brennan and Jaworski (2015a) call the kind of worry expressed by Dr. Towers a semiotic 
objection to a market. They formulate these objections as follows: 
Semiotic Objection: Independently of noncommunicative objections, to engage 
in a market in some good or service X is a form of symbolic expression that 
communicates the wrong motive, or the wrong attitude toward X, or expresses an attitude 
that is incompatible with the intrinsic dignity of X, or would show disrespect or 
irreverence for some practice, custom, belief, or relationship with which X is associated. 
(Brennan and Jaworski 2015a: 1055) 
Brennan and Jaworski argue that all semiotic objections fail. They claim that the meaning of a 
market transaction is a “highly contingent, fluid, socially constructed fact.” What a market 
exchange means, what attitudes it expresses, depends on a culture’s interpretive practices. As 
such, the meaning that a culture imputes to markets is both malleable and subject to moral 
evaluation. So, if a market in some good e.g. kidneys could increase the supply, access, or quality 
of that good without violating rights or harming those involved, Brennan and Jaworski would say 
that we should allow the market and work to revise our semiotics.  If they are right, then a 1
powerful objection to certain kinds of markets is neutralized. So we should ask: is the meaning 
of a market transaction a highly contingent, socially constructed fact? 
 The main argument Brennan and Jaworski use for the contingency of the meaning of 
market transactions is an argument from diversity. Their strategy is to showcase the great 
diversity of attitudes people hold toward the things they buy and sell. For instance, we allow the 
buying and selling of animals and yet many people clearly love and respect their pets. Collectors 
buy and sell great works of art while respecting the significance of the artwork. In some cultures 
money is regularly exchanged for sex, though there is no evidence that the people in these 
cultures treat sex as a mere commodity (Jaworski and Brennan 2015a: 1064). People can have all 
kinds of attitudes toward the things they buy and sell. So we shouldn’t think that any one specific 
attitude is necessarily expressed by a market transaction. 
 In one sense, Brennan and Jaworski’s point is highly persuasive. The human mind is 
flexible enough to hold any attitude toward just about anything. There is no reason that we must 
think of the things we buy and sell in purely instrumental terms or that we must express certain 
inappropriate attitudes toward the things we buy and sell. 
 But in another sense, they miss something important. When you buy some good, you 
express your preference for that good. That our transaction communicates a preference is not a 
contingent social fact, but a necessary part of the meaning of a market transaction. And there is a 
cogent semiotic objection that can be built on this mundane fact. 
II. NON-MARKET GOODS AND NON-CONTINGENT ATTITUDES  
 To see what I have in mind, consider an argument made by Michael Sandel. Though 
Sandel (2000) mentions semiotic objections, he is mostly concerned with the fact that market 
forces can corrupt certain goods.  When things like intimacy, recommendations, or votes are 2
subjected to market forces, Sandel claims, they are degraded or destroyed. The market 
necessarily changes the good in question. In extreme cases, some goods simply can’t be bought 
or sold. Putting them up for sale would change them in some fundamental way. 
 In a number of places, Jaworski and Brennan claim that if it is permissible to give 
something away, then it is permissible to sell it.  The point Sandel makes is that some goods 3
which can be given away can’t be sold. Add Sandel’s point to the claim that market transactions 
express preferences and you have a semiotic objection which does not depend on contingent 
social facts about the meanings of markets. When we engage in certain kinds of markets, we are 
expressing our preference for the market good over a related good that we could otherwise get 
but that can’t be bought and sold. The expression of this preference is not just a contingent 
feature of the market transaction, but necessarily connected to the practice of buying and selling. 
Here are some examples. 
(Intimacy) Imagine that prostitution was completely legal, accepted by society, non-
exploitive and not harmful to those involved. In such a world, would you purchase sex? 
Many of the people I’ve put this question to say “No.” When asked to explain, they say 
that they aren’t interested in that kind of sex. Sex with a partner who wants to have sex 
with you and is willing to give gratification as a gift is what they really desire. But what 
is for sale is sex with a partner who was paid to have sex with you and who is giving you 
gratification as part of an exchange. If gifted-sex is really different from bought-sex, and 
if both are available, then we communicate our preference for the one over the other 
when we use our limited time and resources to seek out bought-sex.  4
(Acknowledgements) Jaworski and Brennan recently published a book. To show us their 
comfort with markets they decided to sell acknowledgements.  When I first heard this, I 5
thought, “That’s not the kind of acknowledgement I would really want.” What I want is 
an acknowledgement that is freely given as result of my helpful input. That good can’t be 
sold, it can only be given away. A gifted-acknowledgement is not the same thing as a 
purchased-acknowledgement. If we use our limited time and resources to buy an 
acknowledgement instead of doing the kinds of things that might make us candidates to 
receive the gifted-acknowledgement, we are saying something about how we value these 
two goods. 
(Votes) Think about the difference between a politician who was elected by buying up a 
majority of the electorate’s votes and one who was elected because the majority of the 
electorate gifted their vote to that politician. Both the bought-votes and the gifted-votes 
might get you elected but, intuitively, the goods differ in important ways. We might say to 
the politician, after she had used vote buying to win a few elections, “Why do you keep 
buying up elections? Don’t you care about the actual approval of the electorate?” 
 More work needs to be done to turn these observations into cogent semiotic arguments. 
For now, these examples are meant to highlight the distinction between market transactions and 
gifts. Market exchanges involve a giving-of-this-for-a-getting-of-that. Gifts involve simply a 
giving-of-this. Even when we engage in reciprocal gifting, we don’t give on the condition of 
getting.  
 Votes, intimacy, and acknowledgements have something in common that make the gifted 
versions of these goods different from their paid-for cousins: they all involve attitudes that are 
individuated by being responses to certain kinds of reasons. Examples of such attitudes are love, 
admiration, respect, and gratitude. What makes some attitude an instance of admiration isn’t just 
a kind of feeling you have, it’s the fact that you have that feeling as the result of features you 
take to be admirable. You can’t admire someone for having features you take to be lowly or 
deplorable. You also can’t admire them just because they gave you some cash.  The giving-of-6
this-for-the-getting-of-that nature of market exchanges means that true admiration can’t be 
bought; it must be a gift in response to qualities taken as admirable. That’s why a gifted-
acknowledgement is different from a bought-acknowledgement and why the first may involve 
true admiration while the second cannot.  7
 I’d like to emphasize again that I have said nothing thus far about the permissibility of 
buying things like votes, intimacy, or acknowledgements. I’m only repeating Sandel’s point that 
some goods, by their very nature, can be given away but can’t be bought and sold. It is 
unfortunate that Sandel puts this point by saying that market transactions corrupt certain goods. 
First, this obscures the fact that the gifted goods and the purchased goods are (at least in some 
cases) not the same good. Second, it presumes an answer to the question about the relative value 
of the gifted good and the purchased good. It might very well be that, even if a gifted-vote is 
different from a bought-vote, there is nothing objectionable about preferring the bought version 
over the gifted one. Likewise, gifted-sex might not really be any better than its purchased cousin. 
The point is just that sometimes a market good is not the same thing as a closely related gifted 
good and that when we pursue the market good to the exclusion of its gifted cousin, we express a 
preference for the one over the other. If, on reflection, we think this preference is not in line with 
the relative value of the two goods, then we will have the beginning of a cogent semiotic 
objection against the market in question. 
 One way to understand the force of the semiotic objection I’m constructing is to imagine 
that you are ready to give away some non-market good. The case of intimacy is particularly 
powerful. At the moment of the giving, suppose the person to whom you are giving the gift 
offers to pay for the closely related market good, thereby communicating their preference for 
purchasable intimacy over the gifted kind. Suppose further that you find out that this is not an 
isolated incident, but something this person does regularly. Wouldn’t we think that this person 
has the wrong attitude toward love? And notice that their attitude is not the product of some 
socially constructed fact about the meaning of money or markets. It is simply a product of the 
fact that choice reveals preference and that you can’t buy love.  8
III. FROM INITIAL EXAMPLES TO COGENT SEMITOIC OBJECTIONS 
 Granted, we are unlikely to meet with such a character and we are less likely still to be 
able to ground legal limits to markets on this kind of semiotic worry.  To get from this point to a 9
cogent semiotic objection will require some additional work. First, we need to show that the 
preference expressed by engaging in certain market transactions really has, as one of its objects, 
a valuable non-market good. This requires that the market good resembles and excludes the non-
market good, that the non-market good is available, and that the ‘costs’ of obtaining the non-
market good are not prohibitive. Second, since it is difficult to claim that the coercive powers of 
the state should be mobilized to prevent people from expressing certain noxious preferences, we 
need to expand our thinking away from the question of what an individual choice might mean 
and towards the question of what it means when society permits certain markets. 
 Let’s begin with the first task. When does trading in a market good mean that you prefer 
it to a non-market good? I might, for instance, use my limited time and resources to eat a 
hamburger. I could have spent that time with my family or that money on preventative medicine. 
But eating a hamburger doesn’t express a preference for hamburgers over family or health. 
 There are a few things we can say in response. First, the difference in the three cases 
above is that the bought-good is closely related to the gifted-good. When you buy a specific 
hamburger, even if you aren’t expressing much about how you value family or health, you are 
saying something about the other available hamburgers that you decided not to buy. Likewise, 
when you purchase the purchasable kind of “admiration,” you are saying something about how 
you value the other closely related kinds of admiration like, e.g., the kind that is a response to 
qualities taken to be admirable. Just like the two hamburgers for sale, both the purchasable 
“admiration” and the actual admiration are, to some degree, capable of fulfilling the same 
function. 
 Second, though buying a hamburger doesn’t exclude caring for family or health, paying 
for my vote does exclude receiving my vote as a gift. In contrast, a bought acknowledgement 
doesn’t exclude getting one as a gift. In this way, the semiotic objection I am making is more 
powerful when we are considering votes than when we are considering acknowledgements. 
Intimacy is more complex. Can I give you my love as a gift if I’m also giving you some closely 
related love-like service as part of an exchange? It may depend on psychological facts which are 
unique to different individuals. 
 Third, everything here is a matter of degree. An isolated hamburger doesn’t show that 
you value hamburgers over family or health. But if you regularly hit the pub instead of playing 
with your kids, you are communicating something about your attitudes toward these things. If 
you buy sex a couple of times, that doesn’t mean you don’t value gifted-sex. But if you forego 
altogether the kind of intimacy that can’t be purchased, instead pursuing the kind that can be 
bought, you are saying that you prefer the bought kind. I might wonder about such a person: 
“Don’t they value real intimacy?” 
 Sometimes the gifted-goods I have mentioned are not available or come at too high a 
‘cost.’ Just as I do not say anything about my attitudes toward the hamburgers that were 
unavailable when I purchase this hamburger, I do not say anything about the gifted-intimacy that 
was unavailable when I purchase this sex act. 
 That may very well be true. P may not be able to receive Q’s intimacy as a gift because Q 
doesn’t really love P. So P’s purchase of some closely related good from Q might not signal P’s 
preference for the bought-kind over the gifted-kind of love. But though the gifted kind of love 
isn’t always available, the opportunity to cultivate the chance of receiving it is. So P does signal 
something about P’s attitude when P consistently buys the one and decide not to pursue the other. 
Likewise, when I buy a shirt, I’m saying something fairly strong about my preferences for this 
shirt over similarly priced shirts that are readily available. I’m also saying something, though 
something much weaker, about the shirts that are not immediately available (perhaps because 
they are significantly more expensive or located further away). The preference I’m 
communicating is for the shirt I buy over the other shirts and whatever time, effort or money 
would be required to secure them. 
 Circumstances might be such that, in order to receive gifted-love, I’d need to invest lots 
of time and effort building a relationship. So if I purchase the purchasable kind of ‘love,’ what 
I’m really expressing is my preference for purchasable ‘love’ and time and effort I can spend 
elsewhere over gifted-love and some money. But even in this case, there is still some attitude I’m 
expressing towards gifted-love. Even though the exact preference I express may be highly 
variable, there is still a connection between the purchase of a good and the expression of a 
preference. And notice that this connection is not socially constructed. 
 A related objection goes like this: I might want some special type of sex act that my 
partner isn’t willing to engage in. When I purchase this sex act, I’m not simply signaling my 
preference for bought-sex over gifted-sex. I’m signaling my preference for bought-sex-of-type-X 
over gifted-sex-of-type-Y. That preference doesn’t show that I value purchased-sex over real 
intimacy. 
 Like the previous objection, this one makes use of the fact that goods don't always come 
bundled in nice discrete packets that make for easy comparisons. Our pursuit of certain goods 
often fails to secure the good in question, and so we are really pursuing just the chance of 
receiving the good. Likewise, sometimes two goods differ in more than one way. I might buy the 
blue shirt over the brown pants. Does this show I value blue over brown? Or that I value shirts 
over pants? Or can we only say that I prefer this blue shirt to these brown pants? But what if the 
articles of clothing are priced differently? And what if the pants are all the way on the other side 
of the store? 
 Similarly, if we said to some vote-buying politician, “don’t you care about the actual 
approval of the electorate?” they might respond, “Of course I do! But I also care about getting 
elected and if I don’t buy the votes, then I might not get enough of that actual approval. Better to 
buy up this election.” The politician must choose between chance-of-actual-approval-sufficient-
for-winning-the-election and certainty-of-bought-approval-sufficient-for-winning-the-election. 
Does preferring certainty here show anything about the politician’s attitude towards actual 
approval? 
 We can concede ground to these objections.  It is not true that anytime someone buys 10
votes, sex, acknowledgements or similar goods, they are expressing the wrong attitude towards 
love, respect, admiration, approval, etc. But we don’t need such a strong claim to ground a 
cogent semiotic objection. To understand why, we need to distinguish between two different 
ways of understanding the debate about commodification. On the one hand, we may be 
conducting a debate about public policy by asking when a political authority should ban or limit 
the sale of certain goods. On the other hand, we may be asking more personal questions about 
what market transactions we should be willing to engage in. Semiotic objections, including the 
one developed here, are easiest to understand when they address the personal question. But that 
does not mean they are irrelevant with respect to the political issue. What I’ve shown is that, 
sometimes when we buy certain market goods, we are expressing the wrong attitude toward the 
goods we can’t buy (love, admiration, etc.). Individually, this point may lead to the conclusion 
that, because of the value of the things that can’t be bought or sold, we should avoid markets in 
related goods. The reason I don’t engage in markets for sex or acknowledgements is that doing 
so would express preferences I don’t endorse. Extending this kind of reasoning to society at large 
may help us deal with some of the worries expressed above. Even if we admit that there are 
circumstances where a politician wouldn’t express the wrong attitude towards real approval by 
buying up an election, we can still maintain that we collectively express the wrong attitude 
towards real approval by allowing the market in votes. 
 Here is another example to illustrate these claims. It is now possible to buy Facebook 
likes, Twitter followers, Instagram followers and other things to increase your social media 
exposure.  Suppose one comes to realize that real admiration can’t be bought. That might be a 11
good reason to avoid the market for likes. But someone might object: maybe there is no other 
way to get the social media exposure you seek. If such a person bought likes, they wouldn’t be 
expressing a noxious preference. It’s not that they prefer fake admiration to real admiration, it’s 
just that they prefer significant-social-media-exposure-with-fake-admiration to inadequate-
social-media-exposure-with-real-admiration. So it wouldn’t be right to critique this market 
exchange on semiotic grounds. But if we expand our thinking away from individual preferences 
and towards the preferences expressed by society, we might realize that the market in 
admiration-like-goods excludes or obscures our collective ability to give away real admiration 
over social media. That could be a reason to ban that market or, at least, it is a reason to 
discourage, disincentivize, or limit such market exchanges.  12
IV. ARE THESE SEMIOTIC CRITIQUES INDEPENDENT? 
 It is open, at this point, for Brennan and Jaworski to respond in this way: sometimes, 
permitting a market will exclude the giving or receiving of the more valuable non-market good. 
In such cases we have a legitimate objection to the market, but it is an objection based on the 
negative consequences of allowing that market and is, therefore, not a semiotic objection. In 
other cases, the existence of the market doesn’t exclude the more valuable non-market good. In 
these instances, there is no objection to the market, semiotic or otherwise.  
 In this vein, Brennan and Jaworski (2015a) write: 
Some apparently semiotic objections to markets are parasitic on nonsemiotic objections. 
Some critics of sweatshop labor, for example, claim it communicates disrespect because 
it is exploitative. This is not a true semiotic objection. These critics are not claiming that 
there are at least two things wrong with sweatshop labor–-that it communicates disrespect 
and that it is exploitative. For them, if sweatshops did not involve wrongful exploitation, 
then sweatshop work would not communicate disrespect. (p. 1056) 
Applied to the examples from above, the claim would be that sometimes purchasing sex, 
acknowledgements or votes makes giving and receiving love, admiration or approval more 
difficult. In these cases, there may be something wrong with such markets. But there are not two 
things wrong: that the markets make the gifting of valuable non-market goods more difficult and 
that they communicate the wrong attitude toward those goods. The claim seems to be: if the 
market didn’t make the giving and receiving of valuable non-market goods more difficult, then 
the market wouldn’t communicate the wrong attitude towards these non-market goods. 
 To see the limitations of this kind of reasoning, imagine that I were to casually toss a 
bowling ball out my fourth floor window. You think that this shows that I have the wrong attitude 
toward the bodily integrity of the pedestrians below. I might defend my action by saying: If I hit 
someone, then there is some objection to what I’ve done, but the objection isn’t about my 
attitude, it is about the harm I’ve caused. If I hit no one, then there is no objection to my action, 
semiotic or otherwise. Of course, my defense of tossing bowling balls is absurd. What shows that 
I have the wrong attitude toward the pedestrians below is the fact that I risked harming them. 
Whether or not I actually harm someone, it is legitimate to critique my careless attitude. 
 We can reply to Brennan and Jaworski in a similar fashion. Trading in certain market 
goods sometimes threatens our ability to give and receive the related non-market good. When sex 
is for sale, that might make real intimacy more difficult to come by. If I buy or sell sex, I’m 
therefore showing the wrong attitude toward real intimacy whether or not my individual 
purchase does, in fact, make real intimacy less likely. When “admiration” is for sale, that might 
make real admiration harder to give and receive. Engaging in the market for “admiration” 
therefore shows that I have the wrong attitude toward admiration. Likewise, allowing an 
expansion of the market for admiration-like-goods can show that we collectively have the wrong 
attitude towards admiration, even if that particular expansion doesn’t exclude the giving and 
receiving of real admiration. 
 As Brennan and Jaworski note, actions often have the meaning they do in virtue of the 
likely consequences of the action. Tossing a glass of water into the face of my rival signals 
disrespect because my action generally causes people discomfort and distress. But we do not 
always require that the action has that particular consequence in order for it to mean what it 
means. Even if, owing to some strange preference of my rival, he isn’t discomforted by the 
water, my action still signals disrespect. Likewise, even if some small expansion of the market 
doesn’t have the consequence of making love, admiration or respect more difficult to give and 
receive, allowing that expansion still shows that you have the wrong attitude towards these 
valuable non-market goods. 
 Jaworski and Brennan’s paper addresses the worry that, when we buy and sell a certain 
good, we express inappropriate attitudes toward the good being exchanged. What I have tried to 
show is that when we allow the buying and selling of certain goods, we are expressing 
inappropriate attitudes – not toward the things we buy and sell – but toward the closely related 
goods that can’t be bought or sold. And unlike the attitudes that Jaworski and Brennan consider, 
the attitude we express by pursuing certain kinds of market-goods over closely related non 
market-goods is not simply a contingent social phenomenon, but necessarily connected to the act 
of buying. 
V. THE SEMIOTIC CASE AGAINST MARKETS IN VOTES 
I have so far focused on intimacy, admiration and approval and on some related market 
goods. Because the preference we express by allowing the market depends on many factors—
how ‘expensive’ the non-market goods are, how likely the market is to exclude the gifting of the 
valuable non-market goods, the relative value of the market and non-market goods—I have tried 
to avoid giving any final verdict on markets in sex, votes, acknowledgements, and Facebook 
likes. But pressed to say which semiotic objection constitutes the best case for limiting the 
market, I’ll stake my claim on votes.  13
Brennan (2012) considers markets in votes. He distinguishes between cases where 
someone is paid to vote, but not to vote for a particular candidate, and those where a person is 
paid to vote for a particular candidate. I agree with Brennan that there is nothing wrong with 
cases of the first kind, since being paid simply to vote doesn’t express the wrong attitude towards 
political approval. With regard to cases where we are paid to vote for a specific candidate, 
Brennan distinguishes four cases: (a) where both the buyer and seller justifiably believe that the 
candidate would promote the common good, (b) where the buyer but not seller justifiably believe 
the candidate would promote the common good, (c) where seller but not the buyer justifiably 
believe that the candidate would promote the common good and (d) where neither the buyer nor 
the seller believe the candidate would promote the common good. Brennan admits that there is 
something wrong in cases (b) - (d), but he doesn’t think it is a matter of semiotics. In contrast, I 
think we have semiotic reasons for objecting to all four cases (a) - (d) and to markets in votes 
more generally. 
Selling a vote precludes giving it away. A bought-vote and a gifted-vote closely resemble 
one another and both can get you elected. The connection between votes and a certain kind of 
political approval strikes me as important and worth maintaining. So the gifted vote, insofar as it 
is capable of maintaining this connection, is more valuable than a purchased vote. When we 
allow a market in votes, we therefore express the wrong attitude towards this important kind of 
political approval. And this objection applies even when both the buyer and the seller of the vote 
justifiably believe that the candidate in question is the best candidate. 
In closing, it is worth emphasizing that goods which can’t be bought – goods that involve 
the admiration, approval, love and respect of other human beings – are things that most of us 
desperately want. If it really is true that these things can be given away but can’t be bought or 
sold, then when we buy and sell closely related and potentially exclusionary goods, we are 
expressing attitudes toward love, admiration, approval and respect that are inconsistent with what 
we all believe is the exceptional value of these things. That may be a sufficient semiotic reason 
to put some limits on markets.14
 For a complete list of non semiotic objections see Brennan and Jaworski 2015a: 1053-4. For the claim that the 1
moral imperative is to revise our semiotics instead of avoiding the market, see ibid., 1068-71
 Sandel shows that he is sensitive to the limitations of the "expresses the wrong attitude" critique. He says that if we 2
want to claim that a market in some good expresses the wrong attitude toward that good, we would first have to 
show that there is a proper or fitting attitude to take toward the good in question. But what is the fitting attitude to 
take toward, for instance, kidneys? Is the fitting attitude established by social convention? If so, then it is easily 
malleable. Changing social practices will affect the propriety of our attitudes. Is the proper attitude, instead, 
determined by the nature of the good in question? If so, then semiotic objections will rest on dubious metaphysics. 
See Sandel 2000: 106. It should be noted that when Sandel worries about conventional meanings, he is not 
anticipating Brennan and Jaworski’s critique. Sandel’s point is: if the appropriate attitude toward some good is fixed 
by convention, then changing social conventions will mean that different attitudes are now appropriate. In making 
this point, Sandel assumes that allowing a market in some good essentially communicates certain attitudes. What 
Brennan and Jaworski argue is that markets have no essential meaning.
 Brennan and Jaworski 2015a: 1073. See also Brennan and Jaworski 2015b.3
 There are a number of objections to this way of putting things that I’ll address below. The point I’m making here is 4
not simply about opportunity costs, otherwise the semiotic objection I’m developing would apply to any market 
transaction. (By engaging in the market, we lose out on the chance to do something more valuable!). The fact that 
gifted-sex and bought-sex are closely related and (purportedly) fulfill the same human need is essential to the 
argument.
 See Jaworski and Brennan 2015b: x – xi.5
 Someone might object: you can admire someone for their generosity. In such a case, it appears that the admiration 6
is purchased, but appearances here are deceptive. You might admire someone for having given you money. But you 
do not exchange the attitude for the money. If you did, then you won’t admire them for being generous, you would 
“admire” them in order to hold up your end of the bargain.
 Jaworski and Brennan have given away acknowledgements in addition to selling them. Some of the very same 7
people who bought an acknowledgement received one as a gift. See Brennan and Jaworski 2015b: ix. By doing this, 
Jaworski and Brennan admit the main point of this paragraph: the gifted-good really is different from the bought-
good.
 Jaworski and Brennan consider some related cases and conclude, “... the issue here is not about commodification 8
per se. Rather, it is about transgressing the boundaries of a relationship by communicating estrangement … when 
that is not the nature of the relationship” (Brennan and Jaworski 2015a: 1073-4). The fact that the offer of money 
communicates estrangement, they would claim, is an example of conventional meaning. This is a strategy that 
Brennan and Jaworski employ regularly, claiming that our objections to various markets aren’t really about the 
markets, but about something else. But since you can’t get love through a market exchange, and since the expansion 
of the market in this case precludes the reciprocal gifting of real love, it is the market (and the preference expressed 
through the market exchange) that is objectionable.
 Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for pressing this point.9
  Since these objections rest on the claim that choice does not always express a preference, the defender of markets 10
should feel wary. If there were not a strong connection between what I choose and what I prefer, then the standard 
consequentialist arguments for free markets lose their force. Such arguments require, among other assumptions, that 
individuals choose in accord with their preferences and that the satisfaction of preferences contributes to individual 
welfare. See Satz (2010) p. 17-21 for a summary of the relevant theorems in welfare economics, including some 
criticism of the ethical relevance of these theorems. See also Sen (1987): Chapter 2.
 See, for example, https://www.getyourlikes.co.uk/, http://www.buy-cheap-social.com/, or http://11
www.buylikesandfollowers.net/.
 Brennan and Jaworski seem to hold the strong thesis that no semiotic considerations can justify any limits on a 12
market (Brennan and Jaworski 2015a: 1058).
 Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for pushing me here.13
 Thanks to Peter Jaworski and Jason Brennan for writing the paper prompting this reply. Special thanks to Peter 14
for his enthusiasm and encouragement. Thanks also to Dave Backer, Ben Bryan, Christian Coons, Ryan Fischbeck, 
Amy Kurzweil, Michael Weber, Mark Wells, the Bowling Green State University Graduate Student’s Writing Group, 
two anonymous reviewers and audiences at Bowling Green State University, The Ninth Annual Felician Ethics 
Conference, the College of Wooster and the Long Island Philosophical Society for helpful comments on earlier 
drafts. 
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